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The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Govern-
ment in American Constitutional History. By Mark De-
Wolfe Howe. Chicago and London: The University of
Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. 180. $4.50.
Some years ago I sat with Mr. Mark DeWolfe Howe, together with a
dozen other men of diverse backgrounds, in a seminar on religion in
American society, sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions. The seminar went on for a year or more, and a good bit of
the discussion concerned constitutional issues. Over the months all of
us came to admire Howe's qualities as a thinker and as a man-the
openness of his intelligence, his historical and legal scholarship, his
faculty of nicely temperate judgment, his articulateness, urbanity, and
wit. All of these qualities are revealed in his last book, whose title was
chosen with fine insight-Roger Williams' famous image of the two
realms of reality, the church and the world.
Fortunately, one need not be a lawyer, as I am not, in order to find
the book enlightening. The intelligent citizen today, who is aware of
historical developments in America, will likewise be aware of the "gap"
to which Howe points in his first chapter, "between current social
reality and current constitutional law" (p. 11) with regard to the separa-
tion of church and state. The gap, as it exists on the state level, has
become the subject of public argument in the New York State Constitu-
tional Convention with respect to the so-called "Blaine Amendment"
(Section XI, article 3), which forbids all manner of public aid, direct or
indirect, to religiously affiliated schools. Current realities in New York
State-legal, social, educational, and religious-are vastly different in
1967 from what they were in 1894, when this article became state consti-
tutional law. And a major question before the Convention is whether
the law is not today an anachronism-or in more technical language, an
archaism. Howe does not argue this particular question; and I am not
sure that he would follow me in my affirmative answer to it. However,
this is only to say, with a manner of honest impudence, that his treat-
ment of the constitutional issue of the relations between government
and religion-in-education is not as searching as one might have wished.
The issue is of recent growth and urgency; it is distinct from the origi.
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nal issue with which the Founding Fathers dealt-the relation of gov-
ernment to religion as such.
Howe's initial concern is to illustrate how, on the Federal level, the
gap in question has been created by a failure to respect the realities of
history in formulating rules of constitutional law. Howe is severe. The
Court's interpretations of the past, he says, have been "superficial and
purposive"; the Court "has too often pretended that the dictates of the
nation's history, rather than the mandates of its own will, compelled a
particular decision" (p. 4). In order to follow Howe on to this ground,
one need only be, as I am, the Macauley's schoolboy who knows a bit
about the different historical traditions upon which Roger Williams
and Thomas Jefferson respectively drew. The error of the Court, in
Howe's view, lay in its will to maintain that "the only theory of separa-
tion known in American constitutional history is the Jeffersonian or
rationalistic" (p. 11). There were in fact two theories; there was also
the Williamsian and evangelical theory. Conceived within each of
them, the principle of separation carries quite different overtones of
conviction.
Jefferson's principle was informed by the bias of the Enlightenment
-a bias in favor of religious skepticism and against organized religion,
fashioned out of the fear (in one of Howe's many felicitously ironic
phrases) "lest impious clerks tighten their grip upon the purses and the
minds of men" (p. 7). Separation then becomes a political principle,
designed to protect secular society from the encroachments of religion.
In contrast, Williams' principle derived from a tradition altogether
different in its temper and intention. Williams' concern was for the
faith and for the church. His fear was lest the wilderness and its cor-
ruptions invade the garden and its sanctities, to the destruction of the
latter. Separation was for him a theological principle, rooted in a radi-
cal distinction between two distinct areas of life on earth. The distinc-
tion was established by divine design, and its requirement was that
the garden of the Church, as Williams said, "must of necessity be walled
in peculiarly unto Himself [God] from the world."
I might note here that the tradition to which Williams was tributary
was already ancient when Jefferson and the Enlightenment were still
very young. Howe does not carry his historical argument into the long
reaches opened by this last statement, which is mine, not his. I have
elsewhere tried to show that Master Roger's theology of the "wall" goes
back to the very origins of Western constitutionalism, essential to
which had always been the distinction between church and state (to
use the word "state" anachronistically). His own proper theology of the
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wall was, of course, colored by his own proper ecclesiology, which was
not that of the older tradition. In any event, Williams had much more
history behind him than Jefferson-and the U. S. Supreme Court. In
another context, the point might be pursued; it is not irrelevant, I
think, to the contemporary problem of the gap to which I referred.
Howe did not pursue it, perhaps for the reason that it was not necessary
for his argument.
His argument is that, "if the First Amendment codified a figure of
speech, it embraced the believing affirmations of Roger Williams and
his heirs no less firmly than it did the questioning doubts of Thomas
Jefferson and the Enlightenment" (p. 9). The function of separation is
therefore also to protect the integrity of the religious experience. This
explains the inclusion of the free-exercise clause in the First Amend-
ment and illustrates its intrinsic nexus with the no-establishment clause.
Moreover, the evangelical principle of separation has long been, and
still is, part of the total American social reality, which includes forces
that demand governmental recognition of the religious realities in
human life. This recognition, often accorded, has given rise to what
Howe calls "a de facto establishment of religion."
Of late, members of the Court-for instance, Mr. Justice Douglas in
Engel v. Vitale-have been captured by the theory of those who regard
this factual establishment as an anomaly at law and would do away
with it. But it is an anomaly only on the assumption-or in Howe's
term, the pretension-that the First Amendment incorporated only the
Jeffersonian principle of separation. It is this pretension that has led
the Court toward the outlawing even of those aids to religion which do
not affect religious liberties. This, Howe says, is "an exercise in scholas-
tic dogmatism-a venture in the acrobatics of logic which cannot for
very long have an important effect on the actualities of American life"
(p. 12). I hope he is right in this prognosis, but I am not so sure. Today
the Enlightenment is indeed dead, but somewhat after the fashion in
which God is dead. A great many people have somehow failed to note
its passing. American society still includes some small but organized
forces which strongly support the Court's exercise in dogmatism.
The historical fact that the First Amendment had theological as well
as political roots does not lead to the conclusion that government is
bound to become the promoter and supporter of religion. Howe dis.
allows the conclusion on two grounds. First, the rights guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights are not claims upon government but assurances
against government. They define immunities, not empowerments.
Second, the premise of the Bill of Rights was the philosophy of federal-
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ism, which made national disability the rule and national power the
exception. Both of these aspects of the matter reflect the political theory
of limited government-a theory which is concerned sharply to define
the incompetence of government in certain areas of human life, notably
the area of religion.
It might be interesting to note here that the Vatican I Declaration
on Religious Freedom embodies both of these ideas. The content or
object of the right to religious freedom is simply an immunity from
coercion; and to it there corresponds a limitation set to the power of
government, and to other social powers as well. I may quote here what
I have elsewhere written: "This is good juridical philosophy. It is
proper to a juridical formula-such as the constitutional formulas of
freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly and civic protest-that it
should define the outside limits of a sphere of human activity and
guarantee the integrity of this sphere against coercive intrusion from
without, but that it should not enter, as it were, into the sphere itself,
there to pass moral or theological judgments on the beliefs expressed or
on the actions performed within the sphere. Such judgments are 'un-
constitutional,' beyond the competence of purely juridical authority. In
our case, the juridical formula, 'the free exercise of religion,' contains
no positive evaluation of the religious phenomenon in any of its mani-
festations. It simply defines the immunity of these manifestations from
interference, as long as they remain within the outside limits of lawful
freedom. Therefore the only matters of juridical relevance are, first, the
definition of the limits beyond which the exercise of freedom is socially
unacceptable and unlawful [the Council defined these limits in terms
of the concept of public order and its threefold component], and second,
the duty of others, including government, to respect the integrity of
action that goes on within these limits."
If one could be content to define the relations of government and
religion simply in terms of religious freedom as an immunity from
coercion, and in this sense to define the essential meaning of separa-
tion of church and state, the whole matter would be quite simple. Howe
says much the same thing against the background of American consti-
tutional history: "Had the effort of Mr. Justice Roberts to make the
prohibition of establishment a mere assurance of religious liberty and
the effort of Justice Jackson to reduce that assurance to a guarantee of
free speech been successful, the problems that perplex us today would
not, I think, be as intensely bewildering as they are" (pp. 116-17). In
particular, as he notes, the famous School Question would not continue
to be a thorn in our constitutional and legislative flesh. In Mr. Justice
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Roberts' narrow interpretation of the no-establishment clause, certain
manners of governmental aid of the religiously affiliated school, which
raise no issue of religious freedom, would not seem to fall under consti-
tutional ban. However, as Howe points out, the case is altogether dif-
ferent when the broader Jeffersonian concept of non-establishment is
adopted. Since the decision in the second flag-salute case in 1943, that
adoption has occurred. It has been strongly confirmed by the Court's
reasoning in the prayer cases. (Incidentally, I do not quarrel with these
decisions themselves, only with the reasoning.)
Was the adoption necessary on a historical view of American consti-
tutionalism? I should not wish to force Howe's thought, but he seems
clearly to be saying that it was not. Another road was open to the Court,
indicated by the evangelical principle of separation, which is deeply
rooted in our history. At that, the more important question is, whether
the exclusive adoption of Jefferson's theory is today what a rule of law
should be-protective and creative of social values, directive of Ameri-
can society toward the fulfillment of its original inspiration. Hlowe
does not clearly speak to this question. It is, I think, the actual question.
It is, for instance, central to the contemporary controversy over the
Blaine Amendment. This famous legal doctrine, which failed of
adoption on the Federal level, only to gain it in more than thirty states,
is pure Jeffersonianism. This, say its opponents, is the source of its
archaism.
I may here advert once again to the Vatican Declaration on Religious
Freedom. It did not lie within the scope of the document to deal with
the full range of issues included under the rubric of the relations be-
tween church and state, or better, between religion and government.
At that, it states two principles in conjunction, namely, that "govern-
ment, whose proper purpose is the care of the common temporal good,
ought indeed to recognize and favor the religious life of the citizenry;
but it must be said to exceed its own limits if it presumes to take con-
trol of, or to impede, religious acts." The second principle is clear
enough. It bears on the issue of the intrinsic incompetence of govern-
ment to exert coercion in the sphere of religion, from which it is barred
by the barrier of the human and civil right to religious freedom. The
first principle, however, is stated with studied and deliberate vagueness.
It bears on quite a different issue-the positive duties of government
towards religion in society. The Council implicitly recognized that the
solution to this question will vary greatly according to historical and
social circumstances of one sort or another. Therefore it refused to
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dogmatize in an area where the relativities of history are determinative
of particular solutions.
On the other hand, the Council explicitly intended to proscribe the
Continental laicist concept of separation of church and state. It pro-
scribed, if you will, the extreme Jeffersonian concept of non-establish-
ment. It affirmed two duties on the part of government, each derivative
from a different source. One duty derives from the status of religious
freedom as a human and civil right. It is the consequent duty of gov-
ernment to refrain from infringement of the inviolable zone of free-
dom which surrounds the human person and the religious community.
The other duty derives from the notion of the common temporal good,
which includes the values of the religious experience, personal and
communal. These values are not simply transcendental; they also affect
the substance and quality of human life in the civil community. The
duty of government to the common good in the fullness of its realiza-
tion necessarily includes a duty to religion in society-the duty of "rec-
ognition" and "favor." No legal transcription of this duty is suggested;
only the principle itself is affirmed. The principle, I think, bears much
the same sense that Howe found in the evangelical principle of separa-
tion of church and state, whose earlier operation in American constitu-
tional history has presently met frustration.
I have not done justice to the multiplicity of insights in Howe's book.
I shall simply say that he has succeeded in his effort, which was "to
bring into the light some elements and tendencies in American social
and intellectual history which courts have too often overlooked and
which should be taken into account in any effort to write an accurate
story or construct an adequate theory of church and state in the United
States" (p. 5). His success makes one regret the more that he is not here
to follow the story as it further unfolds and to contribute to the theory
as it reaches for the adequacy which is missing at the moment.
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.4
t Professor of Theology, Woodstock College (Aid.). A.B. 1926, Boston College; A.M.
1927, Boston College; S.T.L. 1934, Woodstock College; S.T.D. 1937, Georgian University
(Rome).
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Federal Tax Policy. By Joseph A. Pechman. Washington:
Brookings Institution. Pp. 321. $2.45 (1966).
The past seven or eight years have been a period of intense activity
for politician and scholar in the field of federal taxation. It is difficult to
specify a point of beginning, and despite an apparent loss of forward
movement and acute interest, the era may not be over.
Chairman Wilbur D. Mills of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee was an important catalyst in bringing the tax scholar and his
political counterpart together. His successful call for scholarly papers
in the field of federal tax policy and their publication in 1959 in the
Tax Revision Compendium1 provided impetus and focus for a good
bit of the subsequent activity. Much of the data and many of the ideas
brought to public attention through the Compendium have been
central to the further development of tax thought, to programs for tax
reform, and to the continuing dialogue.2
Two unrelated events in 1960 were significant in carrying forward
both the scholarship and the political drive for tax reform which Mills
had stimulated the year before: the Brookings Institution appointed
Joseph A. Pechman head of its Studies of Government Finance, and the
people elected John F. Kennedy President.
With Pechman as the creative, driving force, Brookings sponsored a
number of important empirical and analytical studies of tax and fiscal
policy. The results of most of these studies have now been published,8
1. HOUSE CoMMa. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IsT S.ss., TAX REVISION COMi'ENDIUM
(Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUMi.
2. Papers submitted at the behest of congressional committees on other occasions in
the 1950's did not have the overall breadth or the impact of those published in the Com-
pendium in 1959, although a number of them were significant. See Hearings on Forty
Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); Hearings on Federal Tax
Policy for Economic Growth and Stability Before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint
Comm. on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956). See also HoUsE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANs, 86th CONG., 1st SFSs., INCOME TAX REvISION: PANEL DiscussioN BaroPX
THE CoarMrrraa (Comm. Print 1960); Hearings on Topics Pertaining to the General Revi-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
3. E.g., R. BARLow, H. BRAZER & J. MORGAN, ECONoMIc BEHAVIOR OF TIlE AFFLUENT
(1966); G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1967);
ESSAYS IN FiscAL FEDERALISM (R. Musgrave ed. 1965); FOREIGN TAX POLICIES AND ECONOMIC
GRoWTH (G. Keith ed. 1966); R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX (1964); H. GROVrS,
FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY (1963); G. JANTSCuER, TRUSTS AND ESTATE TAX-
ATION (1967); L. KRAUSE & K. DAM, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
INCOME (1964); S. MC.DONALD, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF INCOME FROM OIL AND GAS
(1963); D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX (1966); D. Or & A. T*1ELTzER, FEDERAL
TAX TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL SECURITIES (1963); c. SHOUP, FEDERAL rsTATE AND
G=FT TAXES (1966); THE ROLE OF DIRECT AND INDIREar TAXES IN THE FEDERAL REVENUE
SYsTm (J. Due ed. 1964).
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and they provide some of the base reference points for evaluating
many of the current proposals for change in our tax structure.
President Kennedy's election brought the appointment of Stanley
S. Surrey as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, a man
with talents too rarely common to one in that position. As a law pro-
fessor, Surrey had written extensively in the tax field. His writing
showed both his capacity for analysis and his eagerness for tax reform.
His appointment has permitted him thus far to launch and direct two
major efforts to bring about a degree of reform. For the most part,
those efforts had the understanding and backing of a great Secretary,
Douglas Dillon.4
The long-run measure of the Brookings contribution under Pechman
is yet to be taken. It may prove substantial. Surrey's legislative programs
for structural tax reform met with some political success in 1962 and
1964, but it was not enough when viewed against the backdrop of
demonstrated needs, including needs made clear by some of the
Brookings studies and by the data and analysis which the Treasury
produced in support of its proposals.
Despite the limited success of the reform proposals in Congress,
Surrey's and Pechman's energy and optimism seem limitless. Neither
of them is likely to be deterred even by the 1966 tax legislation which,
for the most part, was a giant step backward toward the crazy-quilt
patterns of the late forties and fifties into which statutory provisions
benefiting the well-to-do had quietly woven their way. The high level
of Surrey's threshold of frustration will be apparent when the Treasury
unveils its 1967 legislative program for tax reform in the face of the
most hostile political forces it has had to face in recent years.5 In writing
Federal Tax Policy Pechman has shown his own determination to
bring some of the current issues in taxation to more people and to
bring to the politically responsible some bases for more enlightened
and rational policymaking.
Brookings has published Pechman's book "[t]o help meet the general
reader's need for factual and analytical information" about our federal
4. President Kennedy's other major appointment with impact on tax policy was Walter
W. Heller as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. He and Surrey worked
effectively and cooperatively to implant the theses of the "new economics" in the 19,4
and 1965 tax reductions. Cf. AV. HE.LE, NEw DL'msiroNs oF PorricL EcoNoway (1965).
5. The Treasury has presented to the House Wa)s and Means Committee its 1967
program for modification of the income tax treatment of the aged, Hearings on H.R. 5710
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 73-77, 195-217,
but it has not yet unwrapped the rest of its package.
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tax system. 6 According to the book, its purpose "is to explain the major
issues" that affect the "use of taxation as a policy instrument," a use
which "remains highly controversial," "so that the interested citizen
may better understand, and contribute to, the public discussion." 7 The
author's obvious hope is for a significant increase in the number of
informed laymen, both in and out of government, who will participate
in the continuing political-economic dialogue and in the processes of
policymaking.
This book is concise, well organized, and readable. It is not a ground-
breaker or a first report of new discoveries or insights, but rather a
survey of the field. It describes the role of our federal tax system in
both historical and current perspectives, it examines the tax legislative
process, and it evaluates the major federal taxes in the context of their
economic impacts. In analyzing some of the current problems requiring
political resolution, it relates a number of the issues of state and local
taxation to those of federal taxation. I know of no other book that has
so succinctly and lucidly performed this service.8
At every turn the book provides statistical information, charts and
graphs to help narrow the choices which confront the reader. When the
author questions the validity of a going solution to a current problem,
he does so with concrete, quantified data that are relevant and meaning-
ful. He relieves the reader from dependency on the author's or his own
attitudes, or on doctrine, instinct or logic alone. Since the publisher's
purpose is to reach the general reader, experts may avoid the book. If
they will overcome their pride enough to read the book, however, even
they will find much that is conveniently compiled and useful.
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the major features of our federal
tax system. It describes the kinds of taxes on which we depend, the sums
they raise, the burdens they create. It also establishes the author's
premise, that taxation, as "a major instrument of social and economic
policy," has two goals: the equitable distribution of the costs of govern-
ment and the promotion of economic growth, stability, and efficiency.
6. The Brookings Bulletin, Fall 1966.
7. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY (1966) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL TAX POLICY].
This book is one of three Brookings Institution publications in its Studies of Government
Finance series that are primarily educational. The other two are J. MAXWELL, FINANCING
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1965) and D. Or & A. Orr, FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY (1965).
8. For a short and pithy introductory treatment see 0. ECKsTIN, PUBLIC FINANCE, Cls,
3, 5, 6, 7 (1964).
9. FEDERAL TAx POLICY 5.
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In Chapter 2 Pechman explains the multiplier effect of a change in
tax rates or federal expenditures and the difference to be expected
from one or the other. The author's careful, clear exposition should
carry the general reader over whatever barrier may have prevented him
from understanding how the fiscal actions of the federal government-
effecting changes in taxes and expenditures-make their measured,
almost pre-determinable impact on the general level of economic ac-
tivity and the rate of economic growth. The reader will see how the
1964 income tax and 1965 excise tax reductions provided a test for the
theorists of the "new economics" and how their theories were con-
firmed.' 0
Pechman suggests a number of criteria for rational choice between
varying taxes or expenditures. He also develops the quantitative dif-
ferential impact of a change in federal taxes vis-.h-vis a change in federal
expenditures, but he evaluates the alternatives only in terms of his
stated objectives for fiscal policy: to stabilize the economy at full em-
ployment, to maintain price stability, and to promote economic growth
and efficiency. Despite the larger multiplier effects to be expected from
expenditure changes, he leans toward tax change (reduction in 1964)
for purposes of short-run cyclical stabilization. His "controlling prin-
ciple" is that "government outlays should not exceed the point where
the benefit of an additional dollar of expenditures to the nation's
citizens is the same in public and private use."" He doubts that this
point would shift sharply in one direction or the other during short
periods of business contraction.
I am not sure that the author has given adequate weight to the dif-
ficulty of reversing tax cuts. By his standards, tax reduction in 1964 was
preferable to an increase in expenditures when full employment was
the immediate goal. But a tax increase to halt inflation in 1966 or to
maintain a desired expenditure level in 1967 does not occur automatic-
ally in a political environment upon a mere restatement of the economic
principles that justified the 1964 cut. The politically influential business
community seems to accept as currency only one side of the Keynesian
coin.
Despite Pechman's reluctance to see expenditure programs triggered
by stabilization needs, it does not seem to me inappropriate to seize
upon recession periods as convenient times to begin expenditure pro-
10. See also Klein, Econometric Analysis of the Tax Cut of 1961, to be published in 57
Am. Econ. Rev. (May, 1967).
11. FDxEnmA TAx PoLicY 13.
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grams to satisfy our substantial deficit in public resources. It is not
obvious that a cutback in non-defense expenditures would be more
difficult than a tax increase when and if cutting back appears desirable.
And if the public sector has been starved, as economists like Galbraith
insist, an over-correction in terms of the quantitative imbalance of the
short-run may be justified by the long-run benefits to be derived from
a needed commitment in the public sector.
Pechman is right in saying that "the level of economic activity de-
pends on the ratio of taxes to expenditures. 1 2 He is also right in con-
cluding that "[t]he appropriate action at any particular time depends
upon the relative need for private and public expenditures.'"1 But the
decision in 1964 was not necessarily right in its entirety. Recognition
then of the continuing, unsatisfied public needs might have brought
about less tax cutting and more spending. A tax cut of smaller propor-
tions coupled with increased spending would have had its impact on
unemployment, and the greater public spending effort might have
gotten at a few of the roots of our unemployment conditions, moved
us ahead in housing and education, and made deeper inroads into our
problems of urban transportation.
Although Pechman regards the tax legislative process as in need of
reform, he concludes in Chapter 3 that its "achievements ... have been
impressive on balance."14 His statement that "erosion of the tax base
has been halted in recent years, and some steps have been made to re-
verse it"'r5 was written before last fall when the Senate, in the dying days
of the 89th Congress, added a series of "eroding" riders to an unrelated
tax bill that had passed the House under Administration sponsorship.10
Despite the fact that his writing antedated last fall's events, the case
for process reform-even the one Pechman made out-calls for a con-
cluding note more likely to interfere with the general reader's state of
repose than this: "Imperfect as it is, the tax legislative process has
produced a tax system that contributes to the nation's welfare."1 7
Since "Congress has not given . . . serious consideration"18 to sug-
gestions for reform, the author's relative contentment is surprising.
12. Id. at 29.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 49.
15. Id.
16. See Foreign Investors Tax Act, 80 Stat. 1539 (1966); N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1960,
Section 1, at 58, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1966, at 44, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3,
1966, at 18, col. 1. But see Letter from Senator Russell Long, in N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1967,
at 18, col. 3.
17. FEDERAL TAX PoLicy 49.
18. Id. at 48.
1040
Vol. 76: 1030, 1967
Book Reviews
Although he would like to see better representation of the public
interest before the congressional committees, more attention to overall
fiscal policy by the appropriations and tax committees, and faster con-
gressional response to the need for temporary tax changes required by
short-run cyclical conditions, he does not impart any sense that there
is a battle that must be fought-either now or ever.
To grapple effectively with the substantive provisions of the tax
laws one must be expert, but the non-expert, the "interested citizen,"
can come to see that the problems of legislative process are his. He will
not see this, nor will he appreciate his stake in process reform, until the
effects of the deficiencies are described concretely and until experts like
the author show him by substance and tone that the need for reform is
acute.19
No doubt, as the author suggests, the public interest would be en-
hanced if special subcommittees were used more frequently to study
and present reports on the broader questions of taxation before a par-
ticular issue is on the legislative calendar. And no doubt there should
be some modification of the committees' public hearing format to
make it more useful. But what of more basic change? Might there be a
helpful analogue in the British or Canadian technique of the Royal
Commission? Would a change in the current style of legislative drafting
make it more difficult for the dollar-laden "special interest" provision
to pass public scrutiny in the guise of just another technical amend-
ment? The statute might be less vulnerable to the quiet lobbyist if it
sought to recapture general principles and an organic structure and
if it abandoned the unsuccessful attempt to state every conceivable fact
situation and to follow each with a particularized consequence. Adher-
ence to such a tax statute might compel the lobbyist to give up a measure
of his cover and to seek his financial goals by the relatively visible ap-
propriation route instead of the relatively obscure tax route. It is likely,
too, that such a statute would encourage administration and interpreta-
tion that are both responsible and schematic.
20
19. The silence of the political scientists is striking. They are not in the fray of sub-
stantive tax reform, and this may be understandable. Their failure to have the tax legisla-
tive process under scrutiny is not understandable. One might assume this would be
an area in which they would be interested in making-and perhaps could make-a sig-
nificant contribution.
20. Cf. Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, 3 COsIsP-xrIUs 1619; Brown, The Revenue
Act of 1964: A Survey, TUL. 1965 TAx INsr. 39; Cary, Reflections Upon the American Law
Institute Tax Project and the Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and
Reappraisal, 60 COLUm. L. Ray. 259 (1960); Cary, Pressure Groups and the Revenue Code:
A Requiem in Honor of the Departing Uniformity of the Tax Laws, 68 Hnv. L. RE%.
745 (1955).
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In any reform of the legislative process, a way ought to be found to
induce the House of Representatives to transmit revenue bills to the
Senate well before adjournment. The House's tendency in recent years
to hold the bills until quite late has contributed to the atmosphere of
rush in which the Senate often seems to act. And the Senate should
consider procedures to make certain that riders unrelated to the par-
ticular subject of an underlying revenue bill will not pass without
publicity and an opportunity for the public's study and comment. The
constitutional requirement that revenue bills originate in the I-louse
is a fleshless skeleton in the absence of a principle of germaneness to
guide the Senate in the exercise of its power to "propose ... Amend-
ments [to revenue measures] as on other Bills,"21 but if the Senate
denies that principle-and clearly it does in practice22-it becomes
all the more important that it give full public exposure to its unrelated
riders and that it pass them in sufficient time to permit unrushed con-
sideration by the Conference Committee and the House.
Pechman introduces his chapter on the individual income tax by
characterizing it as our "fairest and most productive source of reve-
nue,"23-responsible for roughly 40 per cent of federal receipts. The
productivity of the tax is undisputed, and I share the author's bias as
to its relative fairness. I regret, however, that he did not deal more
fully with the expenditure tax alternative before rejecting it. I could
rest more easily with my pro-income tax bias if I were sure that within
our income tax system there were solutions to some of the nagging
problems an expenditure tax purports to avoid.24 If the expenditure
tax's claim to serious consideration were simply that it would dis-
courage consumption when the economy called for a dampening of
consumer demand, one could accept its easy dismissal because less
radical alternatives were available. By taxing only consumption, how-
ever, the expenditure tax eliminates a host of tenacious inequities that
plague us with a seeming intractability. The realization doctrine, for
example, does not explain but only flaunts the inequity of deferring
the taxation of accrued gains on marketable securities while taxing
the unwithdrawn interest in a savings account. It is equally difficult to
find equity in the deferred taxation of current earnings saved as part
21. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
22. Letter from Senator Long, supra note 16. The Senate can find encouragement for
its practice in terms of its constitutional prerogative in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107, 143 (1910).
23. FE.DERAL TAX POLICY 50.
24. N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITuRE TAx (1956), reviewed, Jacoby, 67 YALE L.J. 516 (1958).
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of a "qualified plan" for retirement when earnings saved for retirement
on an employee's own initiative are taxed currently. The exchanges that
trigger recognition under the income tax as we know it may be little
different in kind for many individuals from those which are tax free.
Many taxable exchanges do not reflect a change in an individual's
economic position very different from the change that occurs in a
shareholder's position when his corporation has diversified without a
shareholder-level exchange taking place. A graduated tax (or a propor-
tional one) measured by consumption would tax savings by reference
to a more uniform standard-the extent to which an individual has
withdrawn assets from the community's pool of productive resources.
An expenditure tax would present enormous problems: problems of
administration, economic impact and ideology.2- But before one can
reject the idea because the price is too high, one must first have the
data and analysis with which to weigh the benefits in equity and struc-
tural simplicity which that price may purchase.
Pechman identifies a number of the unsettled issues affecting major
segments of the income tax: treatment of the family, the aged, personal
deductions, tax-exempt interest, earned income, capital gains and losses,
the tax free step-up in basis on death, and income-averaging. He ex-
plores their effect, reviews several of the well-known suggestions for
reform, and opts for some of them. His judgment is probably right that
"[e]ven in its present form.., the individual income tax continues to
be the best tax ever devised,"2 6 but it is sad that this is so.
As it becomes more and more a function of the federal government
to allocate funds for purposes that traditionally had been left to the
market and private arrangement, it would seem wise for Congress to
keep a tighter rein than it can when it attempts to subsidize through the
income tax system. Tax subsidies seem wise when Congress wants a
somewhat permanent subsidy whose effect will not be subject to close
scrutiny and when it prefers to allow unreviewed and perhaps undis-
closed private judgments to determine particular allocations. - T It would
25. My strongest doubts about the expenditure tax raise questions like these: Have we
not reached the point where it may be important for many people to believe it is at least
as good to spend and consume as it is to save? Do we wish to "penalize" consumption
and "favor" savings? At the practical level: Is it at all likely that an expenditure tax vould
be enacted with a rate structure that is sufficiently progressive: one taxing some expendi-
tures at over 100%? Might it not be feasible for the legislatively powerful to "erode" the
expenditure tax base just as easily as they can the income tax base? What percentage
of expenditures might Congress exclude from the tax base for each dollar of sales income
generated by a taxpayer who invests in oil and gas wells?
26. FinERAL TAx PoLuc 97.
27. Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of Science, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 171
(1965); but see Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967).
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be helpful if economists were to review the deductions and exclusions
(implicit as well as explicit) under the income tax-those not justified
on a "net income" theory-price them out, compare the cost and benefit
of achieving the underlying objectives through direct federal expendi-
ture, and then perhaps suggest relevant, quantifiable criteria to help
Congress in its recurrent task of choosing between tax subsidy and
direct expenditure.
2 8
The book's discussion of the corporation income tax includes ma-
terial on features common to both corporations' and individual busi-
nessmen's efforts to arrive at their taxable income. This chapter should
help the general reader to an understanding of practices and procedures
that he might have thought impenetrable because of the mystique that
surrounds them. With perception and insight Pechman describes the
history of the corporation income tax, its special features and rates,
and the debates about its incidence .2  He also poses the traditional
issues as to its continuing value to society, but he omits other issues,
perhaps because they are more in the mind of the lawyer than the
economist.
If we are to have a corporate income tax, we should know the econ-
omist's views on the rules that antedate, but are codified in, Sections
311 and 836, permitting the tax free distribution of appreciated assets.
It would be useful to know what across-the-board corporate rate reduc-
28. For criteria suggested without quantification to aid in the task of deciding when
to use the tax system for subsidization see Wolfman, supra note 27, at 181-82. Cf. Sneed,
The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 597-604 (1965). For the
effort of economists to quantify in the area of tax-exempt interest, see D. Ott F, A. Meltzer,
supra note 3. See generally, J. BUCHANAN, PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEMzOCRATIC PROCESS (1967).
If federal income taxation is to be structured, if there is to be a system and not ad hoe
determinations alone, standards are necessary, and criteria for departure from them
become helpful. If Congress is to increase the federal role in providing for the general
welfare, it can ordinarily do so with less waste and with more direction and focus If It
uses appropriation techniques and not tax dispensations. An ordered tax system-one
with standards and criteria for departure-will give Congress a useful tool for broad
based fiscal policy, dependable resources, and greater freedom to allocate when and as It
concludes it should. If Congress allocates by appropriation, it is more likely to do so In
the open, with objectives stated and review provided. Even those who declaim with abhor-
rence against any notion of standards for a tax base sometimes slip into language suggesting
that they too perceive the necessity for a scheme of things. Professor Boris 1. Bittker, when
he tells the uninitiated or the naive that "the income tax structure cannot be discovered,
but must be constructed ... " (Bittker, supra note 27, at 985), does talk of a structure,
and that, after all, is what many are striving to build when they, like Pechman, propose a
foundation ("comprehensive tax base") for that structure. If Bittker conceives of a
foundationless structure, he must tell us more. Louis Eisenstein, nihilist pretender par
excellence, eschewed words like "loophole," "preference," and "erosion." L. EIsrNsTriN,
THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION 193, 197-98 (1961), quoted extensively in Bittker, supra
note 27 at 981 n.84. Strangely, the word "dispensation" was more acceptable to Elsensteln
as a jumping-off point for discussion. It seems to me that the standards for evaluating a
proposed "preference" or a "dispensation" should include the impact of the "preference"
or "dispensation" on the tax structure's foundation if a tax structure is to persist.
29. See generally EFFEcTs OF THE COOP.RATION INcomE TAx (M. Krzyzaniak ed. 1966).
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tion might be possible without altering the present yield if the prin-
ciples underlying Sections 311 and 336 were reversed. The gains in
equity and in simplicity-the elimination of Section '41 and the prob-
lem of collapsibility, for one -make the change attractive even if
substantial revenues are not involved;30 equity and relative simplicity
are not values to be rejected even when they stand alone. Nevertheless,
the economist's quantifying approach to the problem would add a
useful dimension.
The economist should also look at the difficult problems of basis ad-
justments and tax free reorganizations and exchanges. The reorganiza-
tion rules provide for corporate continuity of basis even though a
transferee corporation delivers boot in part payment for assets, pro-
vided that the transferor does what is necessary to avoid recognition
under section 361(b)(1)(A). Is that the right approach, or would a
step-up to the extent of the boot make sense?31 The reorganization
rules exact a corporate tax as the price of a step-up, yet the combination
of Sections 337 and 334(b)(2) make it possible in the non-reorganiza-
tion area to effect tax free step-ups. Does it make sense from the
economist's point of view that these apparent inconsistencies in ap-
proach continue?
Should a corporation's cash purchase of the assets used in business
by another corporation ever be a taxable event to the seller and should
it ever provide the buyer with a "cost" basis? If so, why is a merger tax
free and why in mergers is basis continued despite the fact that, at a
later date, a cash redemption of the shares held by the former share-
holders of the transferor corporation will not generate a corporate
tax or a step-up in basis? The difficulty in answering some of these
questions suggests some of the difficulties with any corporate income
tax, but the economists might try their hand at narrowing some of the
issues before reaching ultimate questions.
Pechman rejects proposals to treat corporations like partnerships,
describing them as the most radical of the solutions frequently offered
for the "double taxation" problem inherent in our separate corporate
tax system. He is concerned that people of modest means might have
insufficient funds to pay their tax if their taxable income included
undistributed corporate earnings, and that they consequently might be
reluctant to invest in stocks. It is thought equally bad, the author
30. Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for Corporate Distributions and Sales in Liqui-
dation, ComPENDrUM 1643.
31. For a general discussion of this problem, see Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C.
3 COMPENDIUM 1619, 1623-26.
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tells us, to have a system which might compel greater corporate dis-
tributions to meet the tax burden, because corporate saving ought not to
be reduced significantly. He also points to the administrative difficulties
of the partnership method where there are large publicly-held cor-
porations, frequent changes in ownership, and stockholders in the
thousands or millions.
There are weighty considerations in favor of continuing the cor-
porate tax. It is a dependable source of revenue. It provides a handy
tool for effecting dramatic results in terms of fiscal policy. There are
also weighty considerations-economic and equitable-in favor of its
abandonment. I am not sure which is preferable, to continue or aban-
don, but I am not persuaded that the administrative difficulties of the
proferred alternatives are a sufficient basis for continuation of the
corporate tax. We have had experience with the pass-through taxation
of regulated investment companies and we could perhaps learn some-
thing from this.
The anticipated financial burden on poor stockholders and the pres-
sure on prosperous corporations to disgorge could be mitigated. A with-
holding tax could be imposed on corporations at the going corporate
rate, with the shareholders required to "gross up" in their individual
incomes their proportionate shares of their corporation's income. They
would be permitted to take credit against their individual tax for their
proportionate share of the tax withheld by the corporation. This ap-
proach would reduce the economic impact at the corporate level of the
change in tax structure; corporations would pay out in tax what they
would have paid under the corporate tax. If the increase in individual
rates necessary to compensate for loss of the corporate tax is not too
great, the credit made available to the shareholders should minimize
the added cash burden at the individual levels. In light of the credit,
it is doubtful that corporations would have to increase their dividends
substantially beyond the levels they would otherwise maintain. The
withholding tax at the corporate level would have to be non-refundable
in the case of tax exempt shareholders unless we wished to increase
their income substantially and dramatically at taxpayer cost.
I have mentioned this approach to the partnership-type tax treat-
ment of corporations only to indicate that alternatives are possible.82
I do not know whether the corporation tax ought to go. It has economic
32. Pechman describes five possible methods for eliminating the corporate tax or
integrating it with the individual income tax. FEDERAL TAX PoLicY 134-38. The method I
have briefed in the text is a sixth possibility, one offered to meet a number of Pechman's
objections to a partnership approach, but there are others equally worthy of exploration.
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and structural advantages and disadvantages. Economists ought to quan-
tify them, if they can. In doing so, they should not ignore the costs
inherent in the complexities of the corporation-shareholder tax struc-
ture and in the tax planning it fosters. Although "[m]ost experts agree
that it is not practical to extend the partnership method to large
publicly held corporations," 33 I think the experts have not worked
sufficiently at the problem to develop the mechanism or to say they
cannot. The question is whether they should.
In the book's short chapter on consumption taxes the reader will
see in sharp relief the relative importance of consumption taxes and
customs in countries other than the United States and their distinctly
secondary role in this country. Equity and economic considerations
lead Pechman to prefer a broad-based, general consumption tax to
selective excises, but in general, he ranks all excises "low as automatic
stabilizers,"34 and "low in terms of equity,":33 since they tend to be
regressive in their overall impact. In this chapter, too, he briefly dis-
cusses the expenditure tax, primarily in terms that are not pragmatic.
"If one considers income the better measure of ability to pay, the
expenditure tax is inferior. If expenditures are considered the better
measure, the income tax is inferior."30 That, I submit, is not a very
helpful point of departure. As I have indicated, 7 an expenditure tax
in theory may help to resolve some of our seemingly intractable prob-
lems under the income tax; it has its own problems and they must be
evaluated. What cannot be accepted as definitive is the proposition
that the administrative and compliance problems of an expenditure
tax may be too formidable to handle.:
Pechman has performed a valuable service in presenting his chapter
on payroll taxes. Too many of us-general readers and professionals
alike-have failed to appreciate their full significance in terms of ag-
gregate dollars and distribution of the tax burden. As the author
reminds us, these taxes tend to be inflexible and, to a significant degree,
regressive. They may contribute psychologically to the idea of social
insurance, but I question whether this is a fact of undoubted value. The
need is great for a deeper and more general understanding of some
of the problems of welfare economics and equity which the payroll
taxes present. Without recommending fundamental change-such as
33. Id. at 138.
34. Id. at 143.
35. Id. at 149.
36. Id. at 157
37. Supra text at n.24.
38. FEDEA.L TAx PoLIcy 158.
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the substitution of general revenue financing for payroll taxes-Pech-
man is persuasive in suggesting the direction which proposals for
reform should take. As I see it, a program for major tax and fiscal
reform would be inadequate if it failed to consider the economic effect
of payroll taxes and their possible integration with the income tax.
In his brief discussion of the estate and gift taxes Pechman sides
with the view he ascribes to most objective experts, that those taxes
are theoretically "among the better taxes devised by man,"80 and so he
expresses his disappointment over their low yield and the fact that they
"make little change in the distribution of wealth." 40 The existing estate
tax has a schedule of high rates, but it is encrusted with hoary devices
for avoidance. Pechman notes sadly the inability of tax theorists to
persuade Congress to make estate and gift taxation more meaningful,
and he places the blame on the public's failure to accept the theorists'
views, its apathy, and its misunderstanding.
Some of the so-called avoidance devices-the marital deduction,
inter vivos transfers, generation-skipping via settlements in trust, and
particular uses of the charitable foundation-have been the subject of
scholarly inquiry and dialogue for years. The American Law Institute
is examining the problems they present as part of a project for the
complete re-study and re-structure of the estate and gift taxes.
41 It
should be interesting to see whether the tax and estate planning bar
will embrace the American Law Institute proposals. In the area of estate
and gift taxation I suspect that the road to the public and Congress is
through the bar. Experience suggests, however, that we ought not to
take for granted the bar's support of a rational, integrated structure
which will provide little premium for astute planning.
42
The accessions tax has appeal to some who despair of reforming the
estate and gift tax. It appeals to others because they feel it is more
equitable to graduate a tax according to the recipient's accretion than
to the aggregate wealth of the transmitter. This tax, little discussed in
recent years, should receive renewed interest as a result of the American
Law Institute's current study.
39. Id. at 199.
40. Id.
41. ALl, FED. EsTATE AND GwFr TAx PRoJEcT (Study Draft No. 2, 1966).
42. Blum, Tax Lawyers and Tax Policy, 39 TAXE~s 247 (1961). The Treasury's failure
in 1963 to persuade the House Ways and Means Committee to approve a tax on asset
appreciation at death as the price of the §1014 step-up in basis, or even to substitute a
carryover basis provision, is probably attributable in significant measure to the opposition
of members of the bar in and out of Congress.
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I agree with Pechman that although an accessions tax is likely to
foster more equal distributions of wealth, the distributions are likely
to be more equal only within the family of the transmitter. It is not
likely that transmission outside the family will result to any marked
degree. As a result, the tax burden on less wealthy families may be
greater than under an estate tax system.
In evaluating an accessions tax, it is important to consider why any
transfer tax is to be imposed at death. It may be fairer to tax a recip-
ient on his accretion if that is what we are after. On the other hand,
if the social objective is to diminish large family accumulations, a
graduated estate tax would seem better suited. One might well view
the estate tax as a final supplement to the income tax. Perhaps the
ultimate price for an income tax structurally tailored to allow large
lifetime accumulations should be an effective, integrated, progressive
estate and gift tax.
Pechman's final chapter, on state and local taxes, is valuable for its
presence in a book on federal tax policy as much as for its content.
Most tax lawyers (the economists less so) have tended to slight questions
of state and local tax policy and think of federal tax policy issues as
though they were wholly independent of the state and local issues.
It is their interdependence which Pechman vivifies and which I see
as his most important message in this chapter. Today, he tells us, "[t]he
state-local segment of the national revenue system is its most dynamic
element." 43 The need for higher levels of expenditure by state and local
governments is compelling, and these must be supported by higher
taxes. The equity and economic issues in the choice of taxes are thus
more poignant than ever before.
Pecbman concludes the chapter with a discussoin of federal assistance
to the states: the customary grants-in-aid and the more recently pro-
posed partial alternatives of federal tax reduction or relinquishment,
federal tax sharing, and credits against federal taxes for state and local
taxes. Although he does not argue for any particular device, his view is
clear: even if the states succeed in raising more of the revenue on their
own, it is essential to find effective, acceptable tecmiques for greater
federal supplementation if the nation is to succeed in meeting the
demands of education and welfare.
The issues of federal tax policy are more numerous than this book
suggests; some are different from and deeper than those it describes.
43. FEDEmAL TAx Poucy 201.
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Some of the solutions offered are inadequate to the task; other possible
solutions are not mentioned. Nevertheless, the general reader and the
interested citizen will learn a great deal from this book, and the expert
-to whom it is not directed-will find it very useful. Congressmen
and their staffs should read this book for perspective and for insight
into many of the questions they ought to consider before supporting
or opposing new tax legislation.
BERNARD WOLFMANI'
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1946, LL.B. 1948, University of
Pennsylvania.
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